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CONTAGION AND BANK FAILURES DURING
THE GREAT DEPRESSION:
THE JUNE 1932 CIIICAGO BANKING PANIC
ABSTRACT
Studies of pre-Depression banking argue that banking panics resulted from depositor
confusion about the incidence of shocks, and that interbank cooperation avoided unwarranted
failures. The Great Depression --withits concentration of bank failures at particular times and
places --hasbeen viewed as an exception. The June 1932 Chicago panic was a dramatic
example of a banking panic during the Great Depression. This paper uses individual bank data
to address the question of whether solvent Chicago banks failed during the panic as the result of
confusion by depositors. Chicago banks are divided into three groups: panic failures, failures
outside the panic window, and survivors. The characteristics of these three groups are compared
to determine whether the banks that failed during the panic were similar cx ante to those that
survived the panic or whether they shared characteristics with other banks that failed.
Each categoiy of comparison --themarket-to-book value of equity, the estimated
probability or failure or duration of survival, the composition of debt, the rates of withdrawal of
debt during 1931, and the interest rates paid on debt --leadsto the same conclusion: banks that
failed during the panic were similar to others that failed and different from survivors. The
special attributes of failing banks were distinguishable at least six months before the panic and
were reflected in stock prices, failure probabilities, debt composition, and interest rates at least
that far in advance. We conclude that failures during the panic reflected relative weakness in the
face of common asset value shock rather than contagion. Other evidence points to cooperation
among solvent Chicago banks a key factor in avoiding unwarranted bank failures during the
panic.
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and NBER1. Bank Panics and Bank Failures. Before and During the Depression
Recent work on banking theory and history has helped to define the potential
information externalities that can give rise to "rational" bank panics (Calomiris and Gorton,
1991, Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993, and Kaufman, 1994). According to recent theoretical
models of panics, when depositors lack information about the incidence of an observable
shock across banks they may have an incentive to withdraw their deposits and wait until the
"dust settles" and the identity of troubled banks is revealed. Depositors may choose to
withdraw their funds from the banking system en masse even if they know that the size of
the fundamental disturbance is small relative to the size of aggregate bank capital. Calomiris
and Schweikart (1991) and Calomiris and Gorton (1991) argue that this framework is useful
for explaining the major U.S. banking crises of 1857, 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, 1896, and
1907.
This literature emphasizes that bank panics can be socially costly --throughthe
consequent disruptions to the payment system and supply of credit that attend the contraction
in bank liabilities, the failure of banks, and the suspension of convertibility of bank debt. As
Calomiris and (iorton (1991) point out, however, bank failures were typically not the result
of panics during the national banking era. Panics were temporary moments of confusion that
were brought to an end once solvent and insolvent banks were distinguished.
Interbank cooperation can prevent the externalities that cause panics from producing
unwarranted failures of solvent banks during panics. Several recent papers have argued that
interbank cooperation was helpful during pre-Depression bank panics.' Cooperation
primarily took the form of liquidity assistance among banks. This occurred within city-based
clearing houses, and (to a lesser extent) across locations through correspondent relations.Commenting on interbank lending to stern unwarranted bank runs, Nicholas (1907, P. 26)
argues that banks protected one another against uninformed runs; only when banks were truly
insolvent (as judged by other banks) were they forced to close, and this typically occurred
before uninformed depositors could act.
The recent literature on bank panics and their social costs has largely ignored the
1930s. Despite the large numbers of bank failures during the l930s --andconcentrations of
failures at particular locations over short intervals of time --somehistorians of American
banking have argued that the banking collapse of the 1930-1933 may not fit the definition of
a "true" banking panic (or series of panics). Instead the simultaneous collapses of many
banks during the Depression may have reflected large, sudden asset value reductions that
rendered many banks insolvent.
The nationwide panics of the pre-Depression era all occurred just after business cycle
peaks, and followed bQth large declines in the stock market and large increases in the
liabilities of failed businesses. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) show that whenever stock prices
fell by more than 8 percent and (seasonally-adjusted) liabilities of business failures increased
by more than 50 percent, a major bank panic ensued. Such circumstances always gave rise
to a panic, and panics never occurred otherwise. In contrast, the episodes of sudden collapse
during the 1930s did not occur at cyclical peaks, but in the middle of a sustained nationwide
depression. Furthermore, Wicker (1993) argues that the bank failures of 1930 and 1931
were largely extensions of the regional banking problems of the 1920s, which produced
thousands of bank failures among banks that were vulnerable to the decline of commodity
prices and land values --adecline that began in 1920 and continued into the Great
2Depression (see Caloiniris, 1990). White (1984) and Thies and Gerlowski (1993) analyze
bank failures during the 1930s and reach a similar conclusion. Wigmore (1987) argues that
the nationwide banking crisis of early 1933 was a special event that differed both from pre-
Depression panics and from the banking collapse of 1929-1932. He links the 1933
nationwide run on banks to expected departure from the gold standard, rather than a panic
produced by perceived problems in bank portfolios.
While there is general agreement among historians that the bank failures of the 1930s
did not coincide with or reflect nationwide panics of the same type that occurred during the
national banking era, it is still possible that local and regional panics, occurring at different
times in different places, could have had large social costs. Saunders and Wilson (1993)
examine deposit withdrawal rates across banks and argue that depositor withdrawals during
1931 and 1932 were large for both ex ante solvent and insolvent banks, and that differences
in withdrawal rates were small between the two groups of banks. They base this argument
on a comparison of withdrawal rates from ex post failed and surviving banks. Saunders and
Wilson interpret this as evidence for the importance of contagion effects. Our findings of
significant patterns of cross-sectional variation in deposit withdrawal rates for Chicago banks
(discussed below) are somewhat at odds with the evidence reported by Saunders and Wilson.
More fundamentally, there are theoretical grounds to question their view that a similarity
between withdrawal rates of failed and surviving banks implies widespread depositor
confusion, and the related notion that depositor confusion entailed large social costs. First,
solvent and insolvent banks alike can experience withdrawals for reasons unrelated to bank
failure risk. For example, declines in prices and income during the Depression should have
3reduced desired nominal money balances at all banks, irrespective of failure risk. Second,
rational depositors may run banks with small probabilities of failing in a world where failures
are not perfectly predictable. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) argue that it is rational for
depositors to run banks when failure probabilities exceed a minimum threshold (say, 10
percent). If 10 percent of those banks actually fail, that means that depositors correctly
forecasted failure probabilities, not that 90 percent of banks experienced withdrawals because
of depositors' confusion (the Saunders and Wilson view).2 Third, the Saunders and Wilson
measure of withdrawals does not distinguish gradual withdrawals from sudden withdrawals,
and the two can have opposite effects on bank stability. Gradual withdrawals of deposits in
reaction to increases in the probability of insolvency can stabilize a bank by reducing
leverage (and hence deposit risk), by encouraging banks to increase liquid asset ratios, and
by limiting future vulnerability to sudden deposit withdrawals. Fourth, if clearing houses
and correspondent banks were able to insure solvent banks against the threat of unwarranted
withdrawals of funds, temporary depositor confusion about bank insolvency may have had
small costs, as interbank assistance prevented the closure of solvent banks experiencing
withdrawals by uninformed depositors.
In this paper we consider the question of whether banks failed during the Great
Depression because they experienced common exogenous declines in asset values, or because
of contagions of fear that swept banks away irrespective of their fundamental solvency. We
address this question by focussing on one of the clearest and most important instances of a
bank panic during the Great Depression: the Chicago panic of June 1932. We employ data
from individual bank failure experience, balance sheets, income and expense statements, and
4stock prices for failing and surviving Chicago banks around the time of the panic. We
analyze the characteristics of failing and surviving banks to determine whether the banks that
failed during the panic were similar ex ante to those that survived the panic, or alternatively,
whether they differed from survivors and shared characteristics with other banks that failed
outside the panic window. To the extent that panic bank failures were like non-panic failures
and unlike survivors, we argue, panic failures cannot be attributed to contagion.
11. The June 1932 Banking Crisis in Chicago
As Figures 1 and 2 show, mid-to-late June of 1932 witnessed an unparalleled
concentration of bank failures in Chicago, whether measured by the number or total assets of
failed banks. In contrast, the number of bank failures in June 1932 was not particularly high
at the state, Federal Reserve District, or national level in comparison to previous months
(Figure 3). Of the 49 bank failures in the state of Illinois during that month, 40 took place
in Chicago, and 26 of these failed in the week of June 20-27 (Commercial andFinancial
Chronicle, July 2, 1932, p. 71).
Some contemporary chroniclers and economic historians have viewed the June
banking crisis in Chicago as an important example of how contagion and runs on an entire
banking system can cause widespread bank failure. Such views have shaped the regulation
and protection of the banking industry ever since the 1930s. In 1932, the crisis received
national attention, and contemporary reports seem to support the notion that at least some
depositors ran solvent as well as insolvent banks en masse. The commercial aiid Financial
C'hronicle(July 2, 1932, pp. 70-71) provided a detailed account of the runs experienced by
5Chicago banks, which forced some banks to fail. These reports emphasized that long lines
of individual depositors formed at banks, and described the depositors as mostly "women,
[who] as they walked away with their deposits ...clutched[their] pocketbooks under both
arms." Interestingly, some banks that experienced large withdrawals (including First
Chicago and Continental) were able to withstand their "runs" and remain open, while for
other banks (including one 'loop' bank --theChicago Bank of Commerce), the runs forced
closure.
James (1938) argues that the panic was triggered by several factors, including declines
in real estate values, falling local utility stocks and other corporate assets, and a well-
publicized local case of bank fraud and mismanagement. John Bain, a local real estate
developer who owned a chain of banks, was found to have borrowed more than $1.75
million from his own banks to fuel real-estate speculation. It was also discovered that one of
the banks was founded with no capital, but with temporary loans from other banks in the
same chain. On June 9 the 12 banks in the chain failed to open for business (James, 1938,
p. 1033; Wicker, 1993, p. 15). Not until June 23, however, did it become clear just how
large the losses from fraud had been in the Bain chain. On that date the court released its
estimate that the value of the banks' assets were roughly $3.5 million, compared to total
deposits of $13 million (ChicagoTribune,June 24, p.9). In a separate case, Francis Karel,
President of First American National, was arrested on bank fraud charges, also on June 23.
In addition to these problems, the Chicago municipal government had been
undergoing significant strain since 1931. The government failed to make payments on its
municipal bonds in January 1932, and beginning in 1931 intermittently withheld pay from
6government workers or issued scrip. In March 1932, payments to city workers were
suspended indefinitely (Chicago Tribune, June 26, p.A17). The city government's revenue
problem weakened the banks iiitwoways. First, on the asset side, it meant that the flow of
revenue to bank bondholders was interrupted, and that Chicago banks were called upon to
purchase illiquid tax warrants to help keep the municipal government afloat; second, it meant
that city workers were forced to draw down their bank deposits to pay normal living
expenses. Not surprisingly, the delegation of Chicago city officials and citizens visiting
Congress to request federal government assistance for the city in June 1932 included many
prominent bankers. They saw the viability of the banking system and the liquidity of the city
as closely related. The request for $80 million in aid was rebuffed by Congress on June 22
(chicago Tribune, June 23, p. 1).
At the same time, the earlier failure of the Insull utility empire also created liquidity
strains for its stockholders. After the failure of the Insull group, three committees of
aggrieved stockholders formed to sue for damages. On June 22, the court refused to hear
their complaints. Insull's debtholders also suffered wealth loss and illiquidity. Not until
June 29 did the court rule to liquidate the Insull group's assets in full (Chicago Tribune, June
30, p.23).
,By June 23, bank depositors had witnessed, in a matter of two weeks, the collapse of
some of the largest businesses in their city, an enormously costly case of bank fraud, a new
arrest on bank fraud charges, and the denial of relief to their city government by federal
authorities. It is not surprising that depositors became increasingly concerned over those
weeks about the ability of banks to pay out their deposits.3
7Initially (before June 22), bank distress was limited to a few banks, but this soon
spread and was associated with a dramatic decline in aggregate deposits in Chicago banks
(Figure 4). The dramatic withdrawals from downtown banks began on June 22 and reached
their peak on Friday, June 24. James (1938, P. 1034) distinguishes the panic in late June
from previous periods of banking distress in Chicago:
[previous runs.. .were directed against particular banks that were known to be enfeebled; this
one was directed against the whole Chicago money market and the First National group, in
the center of the battle, still had more than a hundred and twenty-five million dollars of cash
resources available, even though it had paid out fifty millions since Tuesday night. In the
case of earlier runs, the crowds had been drawn from a particular locality or a special group:
this time people from all parts of the city seemed to converge on the Loop in hysterical fear
and anxiety.
James argues that interbank cooperation, and the intervention of informed third-
parties, resolved the crisis. In one dramatic scene, Melvin Traylor, the President of First
National, brought an end to the run on First Chicago with an impassioned defence of his
bank. Traylor suggested that depositors should "talk to the Federal Reserve Bank" and other
informed bank observers who would attest to the soundness of the bank. After that speech,
Traylor and other prominent bankers from Chicago and New York met as a group to devise
a plan to defend the solvent Chicago banks from runs. One of the Chicago banks, Central
Republic Bank and Trust Company --whichhad suffered a substantial drain by June 25 --
wason the verge of voluntary liquidation. Fearing the "spillover" effects of such a decision,
Traylor and other prominent bankers managed to persuade the Chairman of Central Republic
(General Charles Dawes) to continue operating by offering an arrangement to infuse Central
Republic with new liquidity.
The initial plan provided for $10 million in backup liquidity from New York and
8Chicago banks and $80 million from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), but the
final deal involved assistance only from Chicago banks and the RFC. RFC liquidity support
for the Chicago banks --likeall RFC lending during this period --wasfully collateralized by
very high-quality assets; credit risk on the RFC loan to Central Republic was likely borne in
greatest part by the contributing Chicago banks.4 Importantly, the RFC agreed to allow
municipal tax warrants --$30million of which had been sold to loop banks (Chicago
Tribune, June 25, p. 6) --toqualify as collateral for its loan. After the crisis had passed, to
reassure depositors further, Chicago banks' reports of condition were published on July 2 in
the Chicago Tribune, pp. 18-24).
This account of the crisis leaves unresolved whether the banks that failed during the
panic were those most likely to be insolvent, or whether failing banks simply lacked the
protection of the clearing house or correspondent banks for other reasons. In the following
sections we address that question.
III. Failures and Survivors During the Panic
In our empirical work, we examine the ex ante observable attributes of three groups
of banks: non-panic bank failures (banks that failed between January and July 1932), banks
that failed during the panic (June 20-June 28), and banks that survived through July 1932,
The dates we chose for the panic reflect James' (1938) discussion, newspaper accounts of the
beginning and end of the panic, and the daily movements of the stock prices of the 10 loop
banks reported in the Chicago Tribune, which reached their nadir on June 27. As shown in
Table A2, adding a few days to either end of our chosen panic interval would not
9substantially affect the sample of panic failures. We ask whether failures of banks during the
panic reflected the continuation of the same process that underlay other failures, or whether
panic failures were observably similar to panic survivors. We focus on five ex ante
measures of bank condition --(1)the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of
equity or assets, (2) the estimated probability of failure, or expected survival duration, of
banks, (3) the debt composition of banks, (4) the rate of decline in bank assets and deposits,
and (5)theinterest promised on bank debts. The various measures of bank risk are available
for different subsets of Chicago banks, depending on the availability of data on stock prices
and interest paid on deposits. Our data sources, simple correlations among the various bank
characteristics we analyze, and a listing of some of the characteristics of the banks in our
sample are reported in the Data Appendix, and in Tables Al and A2.
Market-to-BookValue Ratios
Figure5plotsthe mean market-to-book value ratios of the three separate groups of
Chicago banks, based on stock price data reported in the Bankand Quotation Record of the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Standarddeviations for each group are represented by
the bracketed areas about the mean of each plot. The striking fact illustrated by Figure 5 is
that as early as January 1931 the banks that survived the June panic appeared to be a separate
group with higher average market-to-book ratios. The banks that failed during the panic
generally had slightly higher average ratios than those that failed at other times, but
throughout the pre-panic period (January 1931-May 1932) the market-to-book value ratios of
panic failures were closer on average to those of pre-panic failures than to panic survivors.
I0By February 1932, most of the panic failures had ratios less than unity. Figure 5 shows that
all Chicago banks suffered from capital decline during 1931 and 1932, and that the banks
that failed during the June panic reached and maintained unusually low market-to-book value
ratios long before the panic.
Figure 6 plots the percentage of surviving banks, and all banks, with ratios of the
market value of equity to the book value of assets less than 10 percent for the period January
1931 through July 1932. Clearly, a greater proportion of surviving banks had large capital
buffers going into the panic. This is a rough (and possibly overstated) measure of the
percentage decline in assets that would eliminate remaining equity. The measure may be
overstated because withdrawals from banks during 1932 could have reduced total assets; thus
the true denominator of this ratio may have been falling for riskier banks prior to the panic.
There are no available data on the decline in bank assets at that time.
Failure Prcdictions
We estimate the probability of failure using a logit model of the links between bank
characteristics (e.g., balance sheet ratios) and bank failure. We also estimate a survival
duration model, which is similar to the logit model except that it forecasts the length of time
the bank will survive rather than the probability it will fail.5 The danger of using ex post
failures to estimate failure risk, of course, is that special events with low probabilities may
have influenced actual failure experience in ways that were unpredictable ex ante.6 To avoid
(or at least minimize) this problem, we report logit failure forecasts constructed from both
"in-sample" and "out-of-sample" estimation. In the out-of-sample forecasts, we exclude
Itbanks that failed during the panic from the sample when we estimate the coefficients relating
bank characteristics to the probability of failure. This constrains the panic failures to be
"predicted' using model parameters that were constructed to explain non-panic failures, and
thus prevents special unpredictable events during the panic from influencing predictions of
failure.7
Our in-sample and out-of-sample logit results are reported in Tables la, lb, and ic.
In Table la, we include the following variables (all measured at year-end 1931) in our
specification: size (log of total assets), the reserve-to-demand deposit ratio (a measure of
low-risk liquid assets relative to demandable debt where liquid assets are defined as cash and
government securities), the real estate loan share (defined as the ratio of loans on real estate
to total illiquid assets, defined as total assets less all cash and securities), the ratio of real
estate owned to illiquid assets (which mainly includes repossessed real estate collateral, and
excludes bank premises), the ratio of last year's retained earnings to net worth, and the long-
term debt ratio (bills payable plus rediscounts plus time deposits, divided by total assets). In
arriving at this specification, we constrained ourselves to include one measure of each of the
following ratio concepts: bank size, asset liquidity, exposure to real estate market risk, non-
performing loans (real estate owned), recent bank performance (retained earnings/net worth),
and bank liability composition (because, as we discuss below, reliance on long-term debt was
necessary for higher-risk banks). We experimented with the definitions of variables to
construct each of these measures, but retained measures of the basic concepts even if they
did not prove statistically significant.
We also experimented with including two other variables, which are omitted from
12Table la: the ratio of book net worth to assets, and the percentage changes in deposits and
assets of banks from December 1930 to December 1931. In neither case did the regressors
prove significant or affect our other results. The rates of decline of assets and deposits are
highly correlated with bank failure, but they are also highly correlated with other regressors
(see Table Al), and added no explanatory power to our regressions. In the case of the book
net worth ratio, the estimated coefficient was positive (contrary to our expectation). This is
consistent with results from earlier work on similar data by White (1984, 126). This
puzzling result is reversed when one uses market, rather than book, values to define the
equity ratio. In Tables lb and Ic, we restrict our sample to banks for which we have stock
price information, and add to our list of regressors the ratio of the marketvalueof net worth
to the marketvalueof assets (assuming par valuation for debt). We also redefine the
earnings to net worth ratio using the market rather than the book value of net worth. The
market equity to asset ratio has the predicted negative sign and is sometimes statistically
significant.
The logit results in Tables la, lb, and ic are quite similar for the in-sample and out-
of-sample specifications, which is consistent with the view that failures during panics were
similar events to non-panic failures. The variable coefficients that are most significant in the
logits are of the expected signs. Banks with higher reserve ratios, higher ratios of retained
earnings to net worth, higher net worth ratios, and larger proportions of demandable debt
were less likely to fail.
Figures 7a and 7b plot the failure probabilities of the in-sample and out-of-sample
logits from Table la against one another, and indicate each type of bank (non-panic failure,
13panic failure, and survivor). Not surprisingly, the observations (and especially the panic
failures) tend to lie above the 45 degree line --thatis, by construction, including panic
failures when estimating model coefficients increases the estimated failure probabilities for
banks. Interestingly, however, the ordinal ranking of banks' failure probabilities (within and
across the three classes) is quite robust to whether the in-sample or out-of-sample model is
used. Similar plots using estimated probabilities from Tables lb and ic (not reported here)
provide the same picture.
We report survival regressions in Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c --whichestimate the number
of days the bank will survive beyond December 31, 1931. The results are quite similar to
the logits (with coefficients of opposite sign, since the dependent variable is the survival time
of the bank rather than the probability of failure). Figures 8a and 8b plot the in-sample
predicted durations of survival against the out-of-sample predicted durations from Table 2a.
As before, the rankings are similar, although in these plots (by construction) observations
tend to lie below the 45 degree line.
Table 3 reports the mean and median predicted failure probabilities and durations for
the logit and survival duration models by category of bank (panic failure, non-panic failure,
and survivor), and the significance levels of tests for differences across categories in means
and medians. These results indicate that the banks that failed during the panic were less
risky than banks that failed outside the panic and more risky than survivors. Results using
predicted values from in-sample and out-of-sample regressions are similar, although (by
construction) the in-sample results show less of a difference between panic and non-panic
failures compared to either as against survivors. Overall, our results are consistent with the
14notion that failures during the panic were a continuation of the same process that underlay
other failures. The relatively late timing of panic failures can be explained by their lower ,
aj riskrelative to the banks that failed earlier.
Interestingly, the Chicago Bank of Commerce, the largest bank to fail during the
panic and the only Chicago loop bank to fail, had an estimated probability of failure of 0.019
in the out-of-sample logit. The eleven surviving Chicago banks of that size or greater
(including all the important loop banks) had an average estimated probability of failure of
0.0005 and none had an estimated failure probability in excess of 0.003. This suggests that
the clearing house properly discriminated in its decisions about which banks to protect and
which to allow to fail, and that the clearing house was willing to allow even large insolvent
banks to fail based on objective criteria.8
DebtCompositionand Deposit Withdrawals
Detailed data on the composition of bank liabilities are available for all banks in our
sample, either from Federal Reserve or state call reports. Tables 4a and 4b present data on
the liability composition of banks as of December 1931, divided into groups in two ways --
bythe probability of failure (divided into high, medium, and low risk using the out-of-sample
logit model), and according to actual failure experience (survivors, panic failures, and non-
panic failures). Two interesting patterns emerge.
First, the shares of the various debt categories vary systematically with the risk of
failure. The shares of demand deposits of the public and deposits of banks are decreasing in
the probability of failure, while the shares of time deposits and "borrowed money" (defined
15as bills payable and rediscounts) are increasing in failure risk, One interpretation of this
finding --whichis consistent with observed differences in deposit withdrawal rates across
categories during 1931 reported in these tables --isthat demandable debt is withdrawn
relatively early when banks become risky (long-term debts do not give depositors the option
of costless early withdrawal). Additionally, banks that suffer large withdrawals of
demandable debt are forced to raise additional funds through bills payable and rediscounts
(essentially the CD market of that era). Banks with a low probability of failure virtually
never used this high-cost means of raising funds. Other studies have found that the share of
"borrowed money' is a reliable predictor of bank failure during the 1920s and l930s
(Wheelock, 1992, Mason, 1994).
Second, the liability shares of panic failures are between those of survivors and those
of non-panic failures, and indicate a liability profile of a medium-to-high insolvency risk
bank. Although significance levels of tests for differences in means are sometimes low,
given the small sample size, the patterns are consistent with viewing panic failures as banks
that were considered riskier than survivors at least as early as December 1931. In particular,
panic failures experienced larger withdrawals than survivors in 1931, and were forced to rely
on borrowed money from an early date.
Interest Rate. on Debt
Interest rates on debt should iidicate debtholders' perceptions of the risk of bank
failure. For a small sample of Chicago banks (31) which were Fed members, we have data
on the interest paid during the last six months of 1931 on each of the categories of debt
16discussed above(individualdemand deposits, bank deposits, time deposits, and borrowed
money), whichwe reportin Tables4aand 4b. The banks aregrouped, asbefore, both
according to failure risk and failure experience. It is important to keep in mind that our
reported interest rate differences likely understate the true differences as of late 1931; the
interest paid on each category of debt was paid over the last six months of 1931, and
therefore, may not provide an accurate picture of interest rates paid in December 1931.
Interest rates on borrowed money (the marginal source of funds for high-risk banks) are
significantly higher for medium- and high-risk banks, and the cost of funds on this category
of debt far exceeds the costs paid on demand deposits and time deposits (which are of shorter
maturity). The interest rates on time deposits increase with bank failure risk, but differences
are small and insignificant. Surprisingly, the interest paid on demand debt is lower for high-
risk banks. This likely reflects sample-selection bias; as we argued before, the higher the
risk of failure, the more demand deposits leave the bank --onlythe uninformed ("risk-
inelastic") demand depositors remain. This interpretation is consistent with the significantly
lower withdrawal rates of deposits for low-risk banks during 1931, shown in Table 4b.
Banks failing during the panic paid interest rated in 1931 that were identical on
average to non-panic failures, and different from survivors. Interest rates paid (by debt
category) for panic failures and non-panic failures matched those of high- and medium-risk
banks. Despite small sample size and weak statistical significance, the results on interest
rates provide additional evidence that panic failures and non-panic failures were viewed as
similarly high-failure risk categories of banks as early as 1931.
17IV. Conclusion
Wehavecompared the attributesof banks that failed during the Chicago panic of June
1932 to those of banks that failed at other times in early 1932, and to those of banks that
survived the period. Each of our categories of comparison --themarket-to-book value of
equity, the estimated probability of failure or duration of survival, the composition of debt,
the rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931, and the interest rates paid on debt --leadto the
same conclusion: banks that failed during the panic were similar to others that failed and
different from survivors. The special attributes of failing banks were distinguishable at least
six months before the panic and were reflected in stock prices, failure probabilities, debt
composition, and interest rates at least that far in advance.
We conclude that failures during the panic reflected relative weakness in the face of a
common asset value shock rather than contagion. That does not mean contagion was absent,
nor does it mean that the run on Chicago banks is a myth. Rather, we think it means that --
consistentwith James' (1938) account of the management of the banking crisis --contagion
was short-lived and not very costly. The limited duration and costs of contagion reflected
the cooperative intervention by the Chicago clearing house, which protected its solvent
members from unwarranted attack until the runs by uninformed depositors subsided. Absent
such cooperation, the failure experience during the panic of June 1932 could have been very
different. As in many other examples of banking panics prior to the Depression (Calomiris
and Gorton, 1991, Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991, Calomiris, 1993), bank failures in
Chicago in June 1932 were not a costly consequence of panic-induced contagion or confusion
on the part of depositors about the riskiness of banks. Indeed, it may have been that
18identifying and closing insolvent banks helped to resolve the depositor information problems
thathad threatened solventbanks with runs during the panic.
Was theChicagopanic of June 1932 representative of other banking panics during the
Great Depression? Because panics and waves of bankfailurewere scattered across time and
location during the Great Depression, we believe answering that question will require
analysis of the other local panics, using detailed bank-level data similar to those we have
analyzed for the Chicago panic. Defining and analyzing those events is an important area for
future research on the causes of bank failures during the Depression. If the costs of
contagion were not high (as the evidence from the Chicago panic suggests), that would have
important implications for bank regulatory policy. For example, deposit insurance and bank
bailouts since the Depression have been motivated in part by the perception that bank failures
during the Depression were a costly consequence of contagion, rather than the inevitable
result of the observable insolvency of individual banks.
19Figurc I: Amount of Failed Bank Assets, Chicago Banks, January - December 1932
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Note: Figures I and 2 include only those banks that fiIcd statements with the Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of thc

















Figure 3: TotalBankSuspensions in Illinois, the Chicago Federal Reserve District, and
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Figure 4: Percent Change in Total Deposits of Weekly Reporting Banks in Chicago and
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Figure 6: Proportion of Banks With Ratios of Market Value of Equity to Book Valuc of
Total Assets Less Than or Equal to 0.10
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Coefficient Std. Error t-rauo
Constant 1.28 5.36 0.24
Bank Size (Log of Total Assets) -0.52 0.37 -1.39
Ratio ot Rcacrves to Demand Deposits -4.22 1.48 -2.85
Real Estate Loan Sharc 1.71 2.35 0.73
RatiO O(OIISC*- Real Estate Owned to Illiquid Assets 10.13 11.38 0.89
Ratio of Net Earnings to Net Worth -15.99 4.20 -3.81
Long-Term Debt 20.21 4.99 4.05








Predicted 0 Predicted 1Total Predicted 0 Predicted 1Total
Dependent Vaijablc: Log of Time
Number of Observations
Number of Panic Failurc.s




7 69 ActualO 56








Coefficient SEd. Error t-racio
Constant 3.70 2.82 1.32
Bank Size (Log of Total Assets) 0.35 0.21 1.66
Ratio of Reserves to Demand Dcposcls 2.30 0.81 2.85
Real Estate Loan Share -0.28 1.35 -0.21
Ratio of Other Real Estate Owned so Illiquid Assets -4.66 5.46 -0.85
Ratio of Net Earnings to Net Worth 5.18 4.37 1.87
Long-Term Debt -10.48 2.61 -4.02








Table I a: Logit Model Results Without Book Value of Net Worth
Out of Sample In Sample
Total 70 22 92 Total 68 47 115





-47.954Number of Observations 48




Osi-Squared Statistic (k-I dl)
Signiflcancc Level 2.89E-04
N(0,I)used for significance lcvcls.
Co
Bank Size (Log of TotalAssets)
Ratio of Reserves to Demand Deposits
Real Estate Loan Share










r.aioo(otha Real Estate Owned to
illiquid Assets
Ratio o(Januaiy Market Value of Net
Wcwth to Total Assets










Predicted 0 Predicted 1 Total Predicted 0 Predicted I Total
Tablc2b: Survival ModelResults Using MarketValue of Net Worth as of January 1932
Total40 _!_ 48
Dependent Variable: Log of Time
Number of Observations 48
Number of Panic Failures 0




Bank Size (Log of Total Assets)
Ratio of Reserves to Demand Deposits
RealEstate LoanShare
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Table Ib: LogitModel Results Using Market ValueofNet Worth as of January 1932













2 39 ActualO 37
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Bank Size (Log of Total Asscts)
Ratio of Rcsei-vcs to Demand Deposits
Real Estate Loan Share
Ratio ol'Other Real Estate Owned to
Llliqwd Assets
Ratio of January Market Value of Net
Worth to Total Assets




















Predicted 0 Predicted I Total Predicted 0 Predicted I Total
Actual 0 33
Actual I 8
6 39 Actual 0 33
15 23 Actual 1 8
6 39
IS 23
Dependent Variable: Log of Time
Number of Observations
Number of Panic Failures
Number of Non-Panic Failures
Log-Likelihood
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Real Estate Loan Share
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Table Ic: Logit MOdCI Results Wine Market Value of Net Worth as of January 1932





-39.292Table 3:MeansandMediansofFailure Probability and Duration Predictions (In Days from December 31. 1931), By Class of Bank
In SampleLogit OutofSample Logit In SampleDurationOutofSampleDuration
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Non-Panic Failures
Avcragc 0.711 0.768 0.647 0.773 212 173 314 184
Standard Error 0.038 0.040 0.061 0.069 23 30 65 40
Number 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Panic Failures
Averagc 0.537 0.588 0.303 0.280 371 . 274 1,377 567
Standard Error 0.051 0.060 0.062 0.080 53 37 322 96
Number 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Survivors
Average 0.255 0.165 0.119 0.019 1,338 738 16,545 2.668
Standard Error 0.030 0.04.6 0.024 0.017 191 130 4.051 618
Number 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
t-statistics for Tests of DiIfercncc
Panic. Survivors 4.790**S 496' 34O7•' 4796"• 2.169' l.966'
Panic, Non-Paiu 2.719'' 2.492"3.962' 4.683' 2.754'2.134" 3j39e*S 3.683*SS
Non-Panic, Survivors 8.191'7.32' 9.821' 15.398'3.41 I 2.508 L3fl' 2.327'
Significant at a). 10
Significant at a).05
Significant at a0.025Table 4a: Deposit and Interest Rate Composition, By Cisu of Bank
Interest on Interest 00 Interest on Interest on Change in Change in
Demand Due to Tame Borrowed DemandBank T BorrowedTotal Total
DepositsBanksDeposits MoneyDeposits Deposits Dcpostu Money AssetsDeposits
Survivors
Mean 0.50980.03010.46000.01970.00270.00320.01150.0077-0.3057-0.2773
Standard Error 0.02260.00780.02450.00700.00030.00060.0009 — 0.04090.0829
Numbcrof Otis. 68 68 68 68 18 12 18 I 63 II
Panic Failurcs
Mean 0.5041 0.02170.47420.08460.0021 0.00180.01330.0229-0.4156-0.7206
Standard Error 0.03570.0065 0.03580.01820.00060.00060.00150.0055 0.04300.0805




Nuinberof Otis. 23 23 23 23 5 3 5 4 23 2
Tests of Differences Between Means (t-ststistics)
Non-Panic. Panic 2.38(1.723" 2.685" 2.451" 0.120 0.128 0.193 0.1582.016" 0.915
Panic, Survivor 0.131 0397 0.3014.067" 0.955 1.292' 1.063 —. 1.511'3.717"
Non-Panic. Survivor 2.728" 1366'3.026" 1.405" 0.651 0.991 0.757 —3.07" 2.862" *Significant at cx=0. 10
" Significant at txwO.05
"' Significant at a.=0.025
Table 4b: Deposit and Interest Rate Composition. By Out-of-Sample Logit Probability of Failure
Interest on Interest on Interest on Interest on Change in Change in
Demand Due toTune Borrowed Demand Inteabank Tame BorrowedTotal Total
DepositsBanksDeposits Money Deposits Deposits Deposits Money AssetsDeposits
LowP(Fail)
Mean 035500.05500.39000.01770.00230.00320.01 150.0109-0.2226 -0.3812
Standard Error 0.0343 0.01310.03620.01080.00030.00060.00100.00320.06210.1107








Number of Obs. 38 38 38 38 8 4 8 7 38 6
Tests of Differences Between Means (t-statistics)
Medium, High 4.495" 0.2474.464" 5.323" 0.160 0.617 0.539 1.204 1.283' 0.728
Low, Medium 0.8573.524" 1.918" 0.800 1.376' 0.849 0.5112.123" 2.702" 0.834
Low, High 4.302"' 3.409" 5.242" 5.551" 1.081 1.547' 1.261 0.8973.757'" 1.828"
• Significant at aw0.I0
— Significant at a=0.05
Significant at a=0.025
Note: Deposits arc presented an a proponion of total deposits, equal to demand deposits. intcrbank deposits, time dcposits. and bills
payable and rediscounts. lntcrcsl is reported as interest expense as a proportion of the relevant deposit category. i.e.. demand deposit
interest expense I demand dcponits. changes in total assets and deposits arc from December 31, 1930 to December .1, 1931DATA APPENDIX
The data set for the study consists of several components: Balance sheet data, income
and expense data, and stock price data. Balance sheet data from December 31, 1931 call
reports were collected for all state and national banks in Chicago, a total of 123 banks.
Total assets and total deposits were also collected for December 31, 1930, to permit
calculation of the changes in those variables during 1931. Balance sheet data for the 22
national banks and 11 state banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System come
from the original Reports of Condition filed with the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. State non-member bank balance sheet
data are from the compilation of Statements of State Banks of Illinois. The disaggregated
Reports of Condition of member banks facilitated aggregation of balance sheet categories to
reporting standards comparable with the Statements of State Banks of illinois.
The stock prices for Chicago banks are end of month observations published in the
BankandQuotation Record.
Interest payments are available only for Fed member banks (from the Reports of
Condition).
Table Al reports correlation coefficients and corresponding t-statistics across various
measured or estimated characteristics of banks. Table Al includes banks from all the various
sub-samples. Thus different correlation coefficients sometimes refer to different subsets of
banks.
Table A2 lists the banks in our sample, their date of failure (if they failed during our
sample period), the predicted failure probabilities and failure dates from our logit and
20duration models, total assets as of December 31, 1931, and the change in total assets and
total deposits from December 1930 to December 1931. We list the banks in our samples, as
well as banks for which data were not available to permit estimation of failure risk, or
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Fat Englcwood St B
South Shore SIB
Woodlawn Tr&SB
Cottage Grove St B
RelianceB&TrCo
Universal St B
West Irving St B
Central Mfg District 13
JeffersonPitNail B of Chgo
Nail B of Woodlawn
Ravcnswood Nat'l B
Standard Nail B
Jackson Pit Nati Ii
Peoples Nail B&Tr Co
Midland NaIl B
South Ashland Nail B
North Ave St B
ChgoB of Commerce
CongressTr&S B
Pitillip St B&Tr Co
Old Dearborn St B
Union B of Chgo
Logan Sq. St&S Ii
Kaspar American St 13
Madison Sq St B
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Table A2: Bank Failure Prediction Comparisons (Loon Banks in Bold ltalics3
Predicted
Name
FailurePredicted Probability Predicted Predicted
DateProbability of FailureFailure Failure
(Panico( Failure(Out oCDate (InDate (Out
National Failu,cs in (In Sample Sample Sample nE Sample
BankItalics)Logit)Logit)Survival) Survival)Total Auets
0 2/2/32 0.928 0.974 3/24/322(20/32 823,617
0 2/9(32 0.972 0.993 2(22/321(27132• 2,664,205
O 2/9/32 0.819 0.895 5/28/32 5/7/32 4,249,938
0 2/9/32 0.497 0.226 11/12/328/20/33 852,565
0 2111132 0379 0.773 10/18/327/26/32 1,662,981
0 2(25/32 0.830 0.779 5/241326/11/32 1,091,251
0 2(25/32 0.785 0.508 612013210/24/32 1,931,686
0 3/8(32 0.904 0.804 4115/325112/32 659,547
0 5/2/32 0.856 0.941 5/15/324/3/2 4,331,746
0 5/17/32 0.806 0.423 6/11/32 1112/32 629,280
I 5/21/32 - . - - 1,244,192
0 5-t' 32 0.856 0.908 5/9(32 4/9132 701,859
0 6/6132 0.768 0.814 6/19/32 712/32 6,014,783
I 6/15/32 0371 0.345 10/9/32 5/2/33 2,432,943
0 6117/32 0.689 0.847 7(20/326/23/32 4,413,594
0 6117/32 0.255 0.051 5/3113310/18/35 4$2,617
0 6/18/32 0.854 0.749 5/I 1/326/21/32 1,454,516
0 6/18/32 0.739 0.769 7/12132 7/9132 1,918,850
0 6120132 - - - - -
I 6/21/32 0.870 0.627 5110/328/16/32 3,332,911
0 6/22/32 0.724 0.741 7/16/327/19/32 1.327,059
0 6/22132 0.710 0.109 8/2/3212/17/33 801,072
0 6122/32 0.696 0.141 8/6/32 10/9/33 854,215
0 (122/32 0.639 0381 8(27/32[0/24/32 1,909,324
0 (i22132 0359 0.235 10/2/325129(33 1,206,982
0 6/22(32 0333 0.217 11/1/3211/16/33 5,780,811
0 6(22/32 0.489 0.283 11/5/327/20/33 2025,904
0 6122/32 0.074 0.006 12/28/343/5/46
-
6,134,726
0 6(23/32 0.922 0.916 4/14/323129/32 1,819,087
0 6(23/32 0.863 0.838 5/4/32 5/1 1132 938,722
0 6(24/32 0.200 0.007 11/201338125/43- 8,891,724
I 6125132 0.715 0.313 8/5/32 4/7/33 3,055,546
I 6/25/32 0.635 0.091 9/22(326/24/34 2822449
I i5125/320388 0.283 9(301325/18/33 1,128,4.87
I 6/25/32 0.285 0.010 6/18/33 9/8(39 879,507
I 6125/32 - - - -
I (127/32 0.717 0.633 8/5/32 10/19/32 9,513,034
1 6/27/32 0548 0230 10/91326/13/33 1,255,697
I 6(27/32 0.151 0.007 3/3/34 3/7/42 489,655
0 6/2&'32 0.605 0.563 9/1413212/10/32 4,490,482
o 6128/320.378 0.019 3/31/338/76138 12,725,778
0 6128J32 0.285 0.007 7/4(33 10/19/41 3,030,5 16
o &'2&'32 0.162 0.021 2/5/34 1/5/39 3.494.550
0 6/28/32 - - - - 818,564
0 6/28/32 - - - - -
0 6/29/32 0.659 0.464 8/12/3212/20132 1,57.3,737
0 6/29/32 0.457 0.256 12/30/3211125133 9,fl7706
0 6/30132 0.800 0.912 5126/324124/32 1,883,994
0 6/3(132 0.374 0.191 2/16/33 1(26/34 2,181,720
1 7/1/32 0.615 0.377 9/19/32 4/8/33 5.395,527
0 7/20/32 0.731 0.883 8/1/32 5/9/32 1,338,130Table A2: Bank Falurc Prcdicton Comparisons (Loop Banks in Bold Italics)
Predicted
FailurePredicted Probability Predicted Predicted
DateProbability o( FailureFailure Failure A Total A Total
(Panicof Failure(Out ofDale (inDale (Out AsscleDeposits
National Failures in (InSampleSampleSample o(Saznplc 1930- 1930-
Namc Bank Italics)Logit)Logit)Survival)Survival)TotalAsscts 1931 1931
Burnaidclr&SB 0 8/11132 0.4.61 0.443 11/15/321122/33 •432.210 0.267 -0.352
ParkwayStB 0 11/14/32 - . - 262,714 -0379-1.000
tinityTr&SB 0 12/16(320.627 0i39 8/311325/12/33 461,542 -0.327-0.400
LibertyTr&SB 0 12/29/320.451 0.219 12126/321/13134 8,685.132 -0.138-0.269
AmalgamatedTr&SB 0 12131/320.619 0325 917/32 12/9/32 2,731,244 -0.058-0.014
AustinStB 0 12/31/320.459 0.26612/12)329(25/33 4,478,435 -0.367-0.415
Belmont-SheffieldTr&SB 0 12/31/320.401 0.074 1/16(3312(24/34 824,937 -0.472-0362
Bcvedey St S B of Chgo 0 12/31/320.369 0.132 2/3/33 5/5/34 801.849 -0.352-0.413
Aetna StB 0 12/31/320.056 0.032 1/27/3512)18(38 1,436,880 -0573-0.627
BotdcvardBridgcB 0 12/311320.086 0.001 21251355/13/64 12,177,423 -0.137-0.132
Banco di t-lapoli Tr Co 0 12/311320.006 0.000 513/44 8(2/45 1,535,766 2.413 -
CapitalStSB 0 - - - - - - - -
CsifrcJRep.thliclI&Tr Co 0 • 0.049 0.001 9121/362(11/84 209,936,111 - -
CentalTrCoo(IL 0 - - - - - - - -
CbgoCityB&TrCo 0 . 0.039 0.003 6/14/366/10156 12,936.037 -0.252-0.292
Chgo Joint Stock LandB 0 - . . - - -
Cbgoliuic&TrCo 0 . - . - - - - -
ChgoTrCo 0 - - - - - - - -
CongiyjenloiIL B&Tr Co Chgo0 - 0.027 0.000 &2&/389123/371,008,463,768-0.1930.021
Cosmopolitan StB 0 - 0.241 0.051 71231339/11/36 6,826,287 -0.464-0309
Dtcxcl St B 0 - 0347 0164 11/6(322)10134 5,006,173 -0.302-0.340
Drovers Nat'l B I - 0.008 0.000 9/4/4212/31)99 16,845,437 -0.088-0.080
Drover, Tr&.S B 0 - 0.220 0.018 10121/338(23/39 7,521.134 -0.096-0.106
East Side Tr&.S B 0 - 0.527 0.600 9(29(32 1112/32 1,091,357 -0.344-0397
EdgewaicrTr&S I) 0 - 0.232 0.051 7(27/339(18/35 299,578 -0338-0.644
Edison Pt Si S B 0 - 0.387 0.204 3/22/33 9/1/33 371,217 -0.326-0.637
Fst Nai't B of Chgo I - 0.006 000011/17.145 17/31199547,417,024 -
FatNatiBofEnglewood I - 0.045 0.020 1012513512/13/41 6,535,351 -0.135-0.154
Fat Union Tr&S B 0 - 0.010 0.001 5/25/4212/31199223,759,344 0.270 0.339
Fat-Ti Joint Stockland B 0 - - - - - - - -
Guingcr&Stortanlnc 0 - - - - - - - -
HalstcdExchange Hall B I - 0.028 0.000 5/16(37 5/3/83 787,019 -0.130-0.218
HalstcdStrcctSi B 0 . 0.510 0.194 11/8/3211/26133 2,459,384 -0.306-0.371
Hamilton St B 0 - 0.136 0.036 1/4/343/13/37 604.834 -0.444-0.569
Harris Tr&S B (1 - 0.028 0.000 7/2313812/31/99111,694,211-0.094.0.025
HcitmanTrCo 0 . - - - - - - -
HowardAve Tr&S B 0 . 0.836 0.789 5/18/325131/32 640,216 -0.580-0.742
IC. B&TrCo 0 - 0379 0.105 1017132 511(34 1,537,516 -0.223-0.274
lllinoiaTr&SB 0 - - - - - 103,536 0.000 -
LakcShore Tr&S B 0 - 0.349 0.027 4/12/33 9/5/37 8,027,157 -0.232-0.236
LakcVicwlr&SB 0 - 0.002 0.000 1/16/5212/31/99 8,797,961 -0.322-0.379
LawndalcNatl B - 0.901 0.707 4/27/327/13132 5,326,340 -0.200-0.222
LawndalcStB 0 - 0.288 0.081 5/12133 618/35 2,808,685 -0.429-0.997
Madison-Kcdzjclr&SB 0 - 0396 0.085 1011613211121/34 8,560,730 -0.264-0.312
Main St B 0 - 0.016 0.000 7/201384/25/78 447.330 -0.203-0.373
MayfairStSB 0 - - - - - - - -
MercantileTr&S B 0 - 0.065 0.002 7/17/35 5/9/59 10,271.243 -0.222-0.233
MercltandiscB&TrCo 0 - 0.152 0.002 4/10/349124/5! 5,310,117 0.196 0.262
MerclsantsLoan&TrCo 0 - - - - - 104,224 -0.001 -
MetropolitanSt B 0 - 0.082 0.007 12/9/34415/44 1,354,650 -0.511-0.609
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- 0.285 0.270 4/29/33 9/9(33
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23NOTES
1. See Gorton (1985), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Caloiniris
and Schweikart (1991), and Calomiris (1993).
2. Caiomiris and Kahn (1991) and Calomiris, Kahn, and Krasa (1994) emphasize that
deposit withdrawals can act as a preemptive closure mechanism to' prevent large losses to
depositors. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) argue that bank depositors will not tolerate significant
increases in the risk of bank assets (even if banks remain solvent) because increased risk can
undermine the liquidity of bank deposits. Thus, large withdrawals of deposits may coincide with
relatively small increases in the riskiness of bank assets, particularly for highly leveraged banks.
3. James (1938, pp. 1032-1033) also notes the bizarre, unexplained role of anti-bank
"propaganda" during the panic, which took the form of "mysterious" phone calls to depositors
and the widespread circulation of anonymously authored pamphlets. The source of this
campaign was never discovered, but two possibilities are discussed by James. The first is a
"Marxist group of agitators" who may have sought to bring about social upheaval; the second
is opposition to Melvin Traylor, who was becoming increasingly involved in Democratic party
politics. James favors the latter view because so much of the propaganda was directed against
First Chicago.
4. Mason (1994) argues that prior to its use of preferred stock purchases to assist banks,
the RFC was not effective in stemming bank failures. James (1938, p. 1044) cites the common
view at the time that because of the strict collateral requirements on RFC lending, RFC
assistance often increased the credit risk faced by bank depositors.
5. We use a logistic probability density function in estimating survival duration, following
Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990).
6. For example, if the panic was a common shock to all banks, and a low-probability event,
then the level of reserves might do an excellent job of "forecasting" failure (using "in-sample"
data from the panic) even if the banks that failed during the panic did not have higher ex ante
probabilities of failing.
7.Another approach we considered to solving the problem of ex post bias in failure
forecasts is to construct a structural model of bank failure, using the Black-Scholes (1973) option
pricing model to estimate the ex ante probability of bank failure. Given data on market values
of equity and debt at a point in time and the volatility of asset values at the same point in time,
one can compute the probability of failure of any bank under the assumptions of Black and
Scholes (normally distributed asset returns, and a given maturity of debt). In principle, one
could estimate the probability of any bank's failure over a given time horizon beginning in
December 1931 by combining bank balance sheet data and stock price data. To implement this
approach requires reliable data at high frequency on stock prices to estimate the volatility of
stock values at a point in time. For all but eleven of the largest Chicago banks (all but one of
24which survived the panic) reliable data are not available even at monthly frequency for the
purpose of estimating volatility. Often stock price quotations show no change for one or two
months, which we interpret as evidence of the lack of trading during that interval rather than the
constancy of value. Even reliable monthly data (say, for the year 1931) would be inadequate
to construct believable estimates of the volatility of bank stock at the end of 1931 (a much more
volatile environment than earlier in the year).
8. Only two loop banks showed large (greater than 15 percent) stock price reductions during
the panic --theBank of Commerce and Central Republic. The former's price was reported in
the range of 9-11 (for a $20 par value) from June 18 through June 24. On June 25, the share
price ceased to be reported iii the Tribune,andon June 28 it was formally placed into
receivership. Central Republic --thebank that received the large loan from the other Chicago
banks and the RFC --sawits stock price fall from the range of 47-50 on Saturday June 25 to
a range of 4-5 on Monday June 27. Afterwards, its price rebounded rapidly.
25